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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
placed in a cul-de-sac generally base their decisions on reasoning
similar to that in the Hiatt case--i.e., that an abutting land owner
has an easement in travel on the streets and highways in both direc-
tions, and there is damage to him different in kind and in degree
from that suffered by the public generally." On the other hand,
courts holding that no recovery can be had reason much as the
court in Wofford that a person has no right to traffic in front of
his property, and that the damage to the abutting landowner is
different only in degree from damage to the general public. It is
suggested that none of these reasons is the real basis for any of
the courts' decisions. The courts' decisions are in reality a result
of a balancing of interest of the landowner, who has unquestion-
ably been damaged, with that of society in having an efficient and
safe means of transportation at the lowest possible cost. If the
cases are viewed in this manner, the reason for the shift of the
weight of authority is obvious. With the costs of building high-
ways and other means of land transportation rising and with the
shift in highway building to the limited-access road, the balance
has swung to the side of the public interest.
DENNIS JAY WINNER
Investment Securities-Duty to Register Transfer
In Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc.,' the plaintiff, a New
York resident, was owner and holder of 10,920 shares of Class A
stock of defendant, United States Plastics, Inc. ("Plastics"), a
Florida corporation.2 Plaintiff acquired the shares while employed
by Plastics from one Scharps who, as president, "dominated and
controlled" Plastics.3 On termination of his employment, plaintiff
decided to sell the shares. The stock certificates carried a legend
"
1 Textual writers generally favor giving compensation in this situation.
E.g., 4 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 358-59 (Moore, 2d ed.
1943).
1248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965).
'Plaintiff actually paid $27,500 for. 10,000 Class B convertible shares,
which he later converted on a share-for-share basis into an equal number
of Class A shares. In addition, 920 shares were received through stock
dividends in 1962 and 1964. Id. at 355.
'Id. at 363. Scharps was held not to be an indispensable party to this
suit, which concerns not Scharps' possible adverse claim to the shares, but
solely the question of the duty of Plastics and the transfer agent to register
transfer of the shares. Id. at 360.
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reciting that the shares had been purchased for investment purposes
and not with a view to distribution or resale.4 Plaintiff, however,
secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission a "no-action
letter" indicating that it was unlikely that the SEC would challenge
sale of these shares as a violation of the Securities Act of 1933.
On March 10, 1965, plaintiff submitted the stock certificates along
with the no-action letter to Plastics' transfer agent, a New Jersey
corporation and also a defendant. On March 24, 1965, the transfer
agent, assertedly acting under Plastics' instructions, definitively re-
fused to register transfer of the shares into the plaintiff's name and
returned the certificates. On the same day plaintiff instituted a
diversity suit seeking a mandatory injunction to compel the defen-
dants to register transfer of the shares into plaintiff's name or,
alternatively, damages measured as of March 24, 1965, the refusal
date.' The district court granted the injunction.
Initially, the court held that both defendants were properly
parties to the New Jersey suit. Although the transfer agent, a New
Jersey corporation, was no longer serving Plastics in that role, it
was still amenable to suit for its alleged defaults while functioning
as such. Plastics, as principal, was properly named since its activi-
ties in this case gave it sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey
to subject it to an in personam judgment. Avoiding any broad
ruling that "the mere presence in .. . [New Jersey] of . .. [the
transfer agent] without more, is sufficient to subject Plastics to
personal jurisdiction,"7 the court pointed to four activities that laid
a sufficient predicate for the assertion of jurisdiction over the
Florida issuer: (1) the New Jersey transfer agent had long served
Plastics in that capacity, (2) the refusal to register transfer, on
Plastics' instructions, occurred in New Jersey, (3) Plastics had fre-
quently communicated with its transfer agent in this matter, and
(4) Plastics had agreed to indemnify the transfer agent for any
'Actually, only one certificate carried the legend, id. at 356, but in view
of the final disposition of the case, this fact is immaterial.
' Since the court held, id. at 359, that "plaintiff's claim, realistically
viewed, is not related to, and does not arise under, the Securities Acts,"
i.e., the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa
(1964), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964), jurisdiction rested only upon diversity and
jurisdictional amount.
' The requested damages were $327,000, the alleged value of the shares
on the refusal date, 248 F. Supp. at 356, but the court made no decision on
this point since it granted an injunction, the primary relief sought.7Id. at 359.
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loss entailed by its refusal to register transfer of these shares pur-
suant to Plastics' instructions.8 Considering the issuer's unusual
degree of intervention into the otherwise routine work of its stock
transfer agent-especially since the issuer's activities sought only to
promote interests of its controlling shareholder-the court could
properly find that the issuer's New Jersey contacts justified suing
it there without offense to "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'
This holding is particularly significant in that it allows a share-
holder seeking registration of transfer to obtain jurisdiction in at
least two states when the issuer and transfer agent reside in differ-
ent jurisdictions and when, as may often be the case, the share-
holder wishes to join both issuer and transfer agent. In the present
case, jurisdiction over the issuer was important, since the transfer
agent's resignation made it impossible for it actually to register
transfer (although not to pay damages if assessed in a proper
case), but the issuer could be compelled to take the required
action either by its own action or by instructions to its new transfer
agent. In practice, the holding here means that in the frequent
case where a issuer has or must maintain a New York City trans-
fer agent,1" the shareholder may join both of them in a suit in
federal court in the southern district of New York, at least if the
issuer's activities are sufficiently substantial in relation to the prob-
lem as the court found them to be here. However, the court properly
declined ruling on the difficult question whether maintainance of a
transfer agent is alone sufficient to make the issuer amenable to suit
in the transfer agent's jurisdiction."1
8 Id. at 360.91d. at 359.
"0 For securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange it is customary
for the issuer to maintain a transfer agent and a registrar in New York
City. Additionally, it is common practice to maintain a "local" agent in
the jurisdiction of incorporation. For example, Virginia Electric and Power
Company, whose shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, has
transfer agents in Richmond, New York City, and Boston.
" Relevant here is a common provision in corporation statutes that a
foreign corporation is not deemed to transact business in a state merely
because it maintains a stock transfer agent in the state, at least for purposes
of determining any obligation to obtain from the Secretary of State a
certificate of authority. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-131(b) (4) (1965).
A statute sometimes specifies that such an exemption "shall not be deemed
to establish a standard for activities which may subject a foreign corpora-




Furthermore, the federal court made several significant determi-
nations on the merits. Since suit was brought in New Jersey, where
the Uniform Commercial Code is in effect, the court properly ap-
plied Code section 8-106,12 which refers registration-of-transfer
questions to the law of the issuer's incorporating state, in this case
Florida. Finding no relevant law in Florida, where the Code had
been enacted but had not taken effect at the time of decision,"3 the
court undertook "to prophesy . . . how the Florida courts would
decide the issue if called upon to do so'' 1 and used both Code and
pre-Code common-law rules to make this prediction. Thus, the
Code is recognized as a significant source of general law, although
as it becomes effective in most of the states, there will be fewer
occasions to use it in this way, since it will be applied directly to
problems.
The transfer agent had refused to register transfer of the shares
on the ground that a stock certificate legend recited purchase for
investment rather than for resale, although plaintiff submitted an
SEC no-action letter along with the certificates. The court did not
have to determine squarely the letter's legal impact. For one thing,
as it stressed, federal criminal sanctions could not be invoked against
the transfer agent for registering transfer,' 5 since the prohibitions
of the federal securities acts relate only to the "sale"' 6 of securities,
a term that is not defined to include registering transfer of a security
after it has changed hands. Moreover, where the 1933 act has dealt
with post-sale events, such as delivering a security after sale, it
has specified them." Finally, as a policy matter, registering transfer
does not usually involve the dangers that the securities acts seek to
avert, for these dangers inhere in the actual sale rather than in the
issuer's recognition of a transferee as record owner for purposes
of, e.g., notices of meetings, dividend payouts, and other phases of
the established relationship between a corporation and its share-
holders. A second reason why the court could avoid squarely de-
termining the effect of the no-action letter is its fact-finding that
12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-8-106 [hereinafter cited as UCC],
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-106.
"8 248 F. Supp. at 361. The Code was apparently enacted after the court
wrote its opinion.
"' Ibid.
25 Id. at 358-59.
1048 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (3) (1964).
148 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2) (1964).
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the real reason for refusing transfer was to accommodate the wishes
of the seller, in this case Scharps.'8 Presumably because of the
increased value of the shares, the seller was seeking ways to rescind
the sale and to accomplish this putative purpose had the issuer
(which seller controlled) give instructions against registering trans-
fer. Since this was obviously not an acceptable defense, the court's
mandatory injunction implies at least this much: that a restriction
on registering transfer of shares originally acquired for investment
does not of itself suspend a duty under state law to register transfer
into a purchaser's name, where an SEC no-action letter is furnished
and no other tenable or good faith grounds to refuse registration
are present. Such an implied holding accords to the SEC no-action
letter the effect and weight normally assigned to it, without going
so far as to make it conclusive on the courts. 9 Nor would the Uni-
form Commercial Code seemingly dictate a contrary result. Code
section 8-2042o only states a negative rule that an admittedly lawful
transfer restriction is ineffective unless conspicuously noted on the
certificate; but it does not logically follow that every lawful restric-
tion conspicuously noted must always be effective or enforced. 1
Thus, for purposes of ascertaining a duty to register transfer (or
a liability for refusal), the transfer itself would appear to be "right-
ful" within the meaning of Code section 8-401.22
Finally, the court determined whether Scharps had stated an
" 248 F. Supp. at 358.
" See 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1844 n.533, 1896 n.15 (2d ed.
1961), indicating the extent to which the SEC honors no-action letters.
Loss quotes a former SEC chairman as stating in print "there seems never
to have been 'any case where the Commission has initiated any proceedings
after a letter of this nature has been issued, provided that the letter request-
ing the "no-action" position has accurately presented all the facts."' Id. at
1844 n.533. This does not conflict with the SEC's view, quoted in the
instant case, that a no-action letter "is not binding in a court of law on the
question of the liability of an issuer for permitting a sale of its securities
without registration under the Securities Act of 1933, nor would such an
opinion preclude an issuer from maintaining that a sale of its unregistered
securities by a stockholder would be in violation of Section 5 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933." 248 F. Supp. at 357.
"UCC § 8-204, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-204.
21 Stock transfer restrictions, including restrictions like the one in the
present case, are analyzed in Folk, Article Eight: Investment Securities, 44
N.C.L. REv. 654, 680-82 (1966); a typical "investment" restriction legend
appears at 681 n.131.
22UCC § 8-401, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-401 (1) (e). The Code imposes
a duty to register transfer only if, among other things, "the transfer is in
fact rightful.... ." For further discussion, see Folk, supra note 21, at 706-09.
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"adverse claim"'  to the security, for if so, both under the Code
and prior law, the transfer agent would be justified in delaying
registration of transfer while it investigated the claim. The court
ruled that an issuer's direction not to register transfer of particular
shares alone is not sufficient notice of an "adverse claim" as to
impose a Code duty of inquiry on the transfer agent.24 Not only
was the bare instruction not to register transfer an insufficient
identification of the "adverse claim," but even if this were enough
to create a duty of inquiry, the transfer agent failed to follow
through on the Code-approved procedure for discharging that duty
of inquiry.25 Hence, under the Code neither the transfer agent nor
Plastics was privileged in refusing to register transfer.
Alternatively, the court held, assuming the Code inapplicable,
that both Plastics and its transfer agent had a common-law duty to
register transfer. The precise ground and scope of this holding is
unclear. First, the court noted the control exerted by Scharps over
Plastics to further his personal interests in this transaction by induc-
ing refusal to register transfer. This holding may be roughly stated
as follows: that an issuer acts in bad faith and without reasonable
grounds in refusing to register transfer (or inducing its transfer
agent's refusal), if personal desires of a controlling shareholder
prompt refusal, i.e., where the issuer uses its strategic position to
promote the interests of one as against another claimant.26 Thus,
the issuer must act without favoritism or discrimination in register-
ing stock transfers. To this extent, such an obligation accords with
modern corporate law concepts imposing duties of fairness on direc-
tors, officers, majority shareholders and others in a position to exert
corporate powers. Although the court articulates these ideas under
"See UCC § 8-301(1), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-301(1), for a definition
of this term.
248 F. Supp. at 360, 362.
See UCC § 8-403, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-403, on the duty of inquiry
and methods of discharging that duty. This is discussed in detail in Folk,
supra note'21, at 699-702.
A crucial affidavit in the case
concludes with the statement that Plastics, not being able to make a"
determination with respect to the conflicting claims to the stock,
refused to allow a transfer to be made of the certificates in question.
This statement . . .on its face, presupposes an adverse claimant
dealing at arms length with the corporation of which he is a stock-
holder. But this Court cannot shut its eyes to the relationship exist-
ing between the adverse claimant and his corporation, and the latter's
conduct by reason thereof.
248 F. Supp. at 363,
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common law, they would appear equally to apply under the Code via
its requirement that issuers and transfer agents must always act
in good faith.1
7
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
Military Law-Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Applied
to Special Court-Martial
Petitioner in Application of Stapley,' a private first class in the
regular Army, was tried for and convicted of four violations' of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice by special court-martial convened
at Fort Douglas, Utah. He was sentenced to be confined at hard
labor for three months, to forfeit fifty-five dollars of his pay per
month for six months and to be reduced in rank to private. At the
outset petitioner requested that he be represented by a qualified mili-
tary lawyer. His request was denied, and he was told that to retain
individual civilian counsel would cost about 150 dollars. Unable to
pay that amount, he proceeded to trial represented by a captain in
the Veterinary Corps and a second lieutenant, "neither . . . [of
whom] had any experience before or with any court-martial or in
advising persons charged with offenses."3 Acting on their advice,
petitioner entered into a pretrial agreemen with the convening
authority, pleaded guilty to all charges, made no request for enlisted
members on the court, did not object at the trial to the denial of
" Under the Code, the transfer agent has a duty of good faith running
to the holder or owner of securities. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-406(1) (b).
"'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(19). On good faith, see Folk, supra
note 21, at 708.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
'246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
' UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 86 (unauthorized absence),
90 (willful disobedience of a superior commissioned officer), 117 (provok-
ing speech or gestures), 123a (making, drawing or uttering check, draft
or order without sufficient funds), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 890, 917, 923a (1964)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
'246 F. Supp. at 319.
'A pretrial agreement is an administrative procedure, or "negotiated
plea," whereby the accused agrees to enter a plea of guilty to all charges
in return for a guarantee that any sentence in excess of a stipulated maxi-
mum (here two months confinement and two months forfeiture of pay)
will be disapproved.
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